Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting

François Durand, Antonin Macé and Matias Nuñez
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François Durand: Nokia Bell Labs France, Enabling Computing Technologies Department of Mathematics of Dynamic Networks and Information, Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs France / LINCS - Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs France [Nozay] - Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs France

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider three rules, that differ on the number of candidates that voters can support: Plurality (one), Anti-Plurality (two) and Approval Voting (one or two). We show that the Condorcet winner is always elected at some equilibrium under Approval Voting, and that this rule provides better welfare guarantees than Plurality. We then numerically study a dynamic process of political tâtonnement which delivers rich insights. The Condorcet winner is virtually always elected under Approval Voting, but not under the other rules. The dominance of Approval Voting is robust to several alternative welfare criteria and the introduction of expressive voters.

Keywords: Approval voting; Poisson games; Strategic voting; Condorcet consistency; Fictitious play; Expressive voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, 146, pp.1-34. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.007⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting (2024)
Working Paper: Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting (2024)
Working Paper: Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting (2023)
Working Paper: Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-04630490

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.007

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