Merger selection, evidence provision, and the timing of merger control

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean‐philippe Tropeano
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Jean‐philippe Tropeano: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: Merger control impacts the type of merger projects that are submitted, as well as the information provided by the merging parties upon assessment. In this paper, we consider the outcomes in terms of selection of merger types and evidence provision of alternative timings for merger review, pre‐ or postconsummation of the merger. We show that the selection effect induced by the ex post merger review is welfare‐improving due to the deterrence of the most anticompetitive merger projects. In contrast, the welfare impact of evidence provision under ex post assessment is ambiguous. Balancing these two effects makes possible the welfare comparison between the ex ante and the ex post merger policy enforcement.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Evidence provision; Merger control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
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Published in Bulletin of Economic Research, 2023, 75 (1), pp.209-222. ⟨10.1111/boer.12365⟩

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Journal Article: Merger selection, evidence provision, and the timing of merger control (2023)
Working Paper: Merger selection, evidence provision, and the timing of merger control (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-04632063

DOI: 10.1111/boer.12365

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