The Chair Allocation problem

Francis Bloch (), David Cantala and Damián Gibaja
Additional contact information
Francis Bloch: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris
David Cantala: El Colegio de México
Damián Gibaja: UPAEP - Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We introduce the Chair Allocation problem, a three-sided matching market where researchers apply for a chair in a university, and universities request chairs (composed of a university and a research topic) to a central authority. We propose a new algorithm, the Chair Nested Deferred Acceptance algorithm, and show that it is fair, undominated by other fair assignments, and strategy-proof for researchers.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, inPress, ⟨10.1007/s00355-025-01630-w⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-05340400

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-025-01630-w

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().