How (not) to elicit social image effects: When disclosure fails to boost charitable effort

Roberto Galbiati (), Emeric Henry (), Nicolas Jacquemet () and Itzhak Rasooly
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Roberto Galbiati: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Emeric Henry: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Nicolas Jacquemet: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris
Itzhak Rasooly: University of London [London]

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Abstract: In this paper, we report the results of two experiments that attempt to elicit social image effects. The first experiment (N=1,252) provides little evidence that individuals behave in more ‘prosocial' ways when their choices are disclosed to other participants. If anything, imposing observability appears to make the participants slightly less prosocial, although this effect is not statistically significant. The second experiment (N=750) generates similar results and further suggests that our results are not dependent on the omission (or inclusion) of ranking information. We discuss why our experiments fail to generate the results that we had expected and why our results differ from those in the published literature.

Keywords: Social image; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05719080v2
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Published in Theory and Decision, 2026, ⟨10.1007/s11238-026-10148-1⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-05719080

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-026-10148-1

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