Strategic hiding and exploration in networks

Francis Bloch (), Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubiński
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Francis Bloch: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris
Bhaskar Dutta: Ashoka University, Sonipat, India.
Marcin Dziubiński: University of Warsaw

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Abstract: We propose and study a model of strategic network design and exploration where the hider, subject to a budget constraint restricting the number of links, chooses a network with a distinguished source node and the location of an object in the network, reachable from the source. Meanwhile, the seeker, not observing the network and the location of the object, chooses a network exploration strategy starting at a fixed node in the network. The network exploration follows the expanding search paradigm of Alpern and Lidbetter (2013). We obtain a Nash equilibrium and characterize equilibrium payoffs in the case of linking budget allowing for trees only. We also give an upper bound on the expected number of steps needed to find the hider for the case where the linking budget allows for at most one cycle in the network.

Keywords: Network exploration; Randomized depth first strategy; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2026, 142, ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102549⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-05837130

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102549

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