Curtailing False News, Amplifying Truth

Sergei Guriev (), Emeric Henry (), Théo Marquis () and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya ()
Additional contact information
Sergei Guriev: London Business School, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
Emeric Henry: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Théo Marquis: LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - Nantes Univ - IAE Nantes - Nantes Université - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Nantes - Nantes Université - pôle Sociétés - Nantes Univ - Nantes Université
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We develop a comprehensive framework to evaluate policy interventions aimed at curbing false news dissemination on social media. Using a randomized experiment on Twitter and X during the 2022 and 2024 U.S. elections, we assess priming for misinformation awareness, fact‐checking, confirmation clicks, and content consideration prompts. Priming proves most effective in reducing false‐news sharing while preserving true news dissemination. We build and structurally estimate a model of sharing, motivated by partisan persuasion, partisan signaling, and reputational concerns. We identify three channels through which policies influence sharing: (i) updating perceived veracity and partisanship of content, (ii) raising salience of reputation, and (iii) increasing engagement costs. Differences in the effects of policies are explained by the salience and cost channels. Content‐neutral priming is best at enhancing salience of reputation at minimal cost and almost as effective as fact‐checking in updating veracity. Salience channel is stronger when users encounter uncontroversially true content.

Date: 2026-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Econometrica, 2026, 94 (5), pp.1563-1601. ⟨10.3982/ECTA22524⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-05840470

DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22524

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().