Optimal Queue Design

Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux ()
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Yeon-Koo Che: Columbia University
Olivier Tercieux: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: We study optimal service allocation through queues when agents have homogeneous preferences and must be incentivized to enter and remain in the queue. The designer controls entry, exit, service priority, and information about queue priorities. Under a mild regularity condition, the optimal mechanism admits agents only up to a cutoff queue length, never removes admitted agents, serves them according to a first-come, first-served (FCFS) rule, and provides no information beyond recommendations. FCFS is also necessary for optimality in a rich domain. The result identifies a new role for queue disciplines in regulating agents' beliefs and dynamic incentives, and uncovers a hitherto unrecognized virtue of FCFS in this regard.

Date: 2026-08
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Published in Journal of Political Economy, 2026, 134 (8), pp.2395-2440. ⟨10.1086/741622⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-05845626

DOI: 10.1086/741622

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