How do coalitions break down? An alternative view*

Raouf Boucekkine (), Carmen Camacho (), Weihua Ruan () and Benteng Zou
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Carmen Camacho: PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Weihua Ruan: Purdue University Northwest, CUT - Centre for Unframed Thinking - ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business

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Abstract: We propose an alternative dynamic theory of coalition breakdown. Motivated by recent coalition splitting events through unilateral countries' withdrawals, we assume that: i) the payoff sharing rule within coalitions is not necessarily set according to any optimality and/or stability criterion, and, ii) players initially behave as if the coalition will last forever. If the sharing rule is non-negotiable or if renegotiation is very costly, compliance to these rules may become unbearable for a given member

Keywords: Coalition splitting; Environmental agreements; Constitutional vs technological heterogeneity; Differential games; Multistage optimal control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04287200v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: How Do Coalitions Break Down? An Alternative View (2024)
Working Paper: How do coalitions break down? An alternative view* (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-04287200

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