Bank's skin-in-the-game and hold-up by illiquid firms: strategic bargaining, dynamic inconsistency and credit constraints

Louis-Marie Harpedanne de Belleville ()
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Louis-Marie Harpedanne de Belleville: Banque de France - Banque de France - Banque de France, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: The loan literature analyzes the hold-up problem from the bank monopolistic information perspective, but if only the firm can fully repay the bank, the loan relationship is actually a bilateral monopoly. Then, if a firm borrows short to finance a long-term project, non-cooperative bargaining occurs at loan renewal. If, regardless of the firm's second-period quality, the perfect equilibrium partition derived from this bargaining grants the bank less than the break-even condition, she declines to lend ex-ante.That is, expected hold-up by the firm induces credit constraints. If the firm gets more by defaulting than by borrowing from another bank, the initial bank cannot break even by filing for the firm bankruptcy; that is, the bank has a weak outside option. Then, even if this option is binding, the previous credit constraints result holds. Such hold-up by illiquid firms provides a new foundation for long-term lending to finance long-term projects.

Keywords: Hold-up; Credit constraints; Subgame perfection; Non-cooperative bargaining; Outside option principle; Perfect equilibrium partition; Strategic default; Liquidity; Long-term loan; Skin in the game; Unverifiability; Interest-bearing asset; Strategic bargaining; Bank; Firm; Loan relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11-19
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