"Deep Pockets'', Collateral Assignments of Patents, and the Growth of Innovations

Bruno Amable, Jean-Bernard Chatelain and Kirsten Ralf

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Abstract: This paper studies how the imperfect collateral assignments of patents contribute to "deep pockets'' savings of innovative firms facing random investment opportunities in research and development (R&D) and determine the growth of their innovations, using a version of the Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] model of credit cycles. Results are: patents as collateral leverage R&D finance and magnify the effect of innovative rents on investment; the composition of current versus future financial constraints implies that firms savings decrease the steady state aggregate debt/patent ratio; the interaction between households and firms savings determines a leveraged growth of innovations which increasing when legal reforms reduce the imperfection of patents as collateral.

Keywords: Collateral; Patents; Research and Development; Credit rationing; Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11-08
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00112518v1
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Working Paper: "Deep Pockets'', Collateral Assignments of Patents, and the Growth of Innovations (2006)
Working Paper: "Deep Pockets'', Collateral Assignments of Patents, and the Growth of Innovations (2006)
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