 Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discountsPSE Working Papers from HAL Abstract: When bidders are not substitutes, we show that there is no standard ascend-ing auction that implements a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium under truthful bidding. Such an impossibility holds also in environments where the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff and is thus stronger than de Vries, Schummer and Vohra s [On ascending Vickrey auctions for het-erogeneous objects, J. Econ. Theory, 132, 95-118] impossibility result with regards to the Vickrey payoff vector under general valuations. Similarly to Mishra and Parkes [Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations, J. Econ. Theory, 132, 335-366], the impossibility can be circumvented by giving price discounts to the bidders from the final vector of prices. Nevertheless, the similarity is misleading: the solution we propose satisfies a minimality infor-mation revelation property that fails to be satisfied in any ascending auction that implements the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We investigate related issues when strictly positive increments have to be used under general continuous valuations. Keywords: ascending auctions; combinatorial auctions; bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium; non-linear pricing; Vickrey payoffs; increments; enchères ascendantes; enchères combinatoires; payements concurrentiels; tarification non-linéaire; payements de Vickrey; incréments. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00575076 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in PSE Working Papers from HAL |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.