Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games

Laurent Lamy

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the strategic and informational details of the participation game are partially-specified. This means that full participation is required to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium for a large variety of extensive modifications of the simultaneous-move participation game in the same vein as Kalai [Large Robust Games, Econometrica 72 (2004) 1631-1665].

Keywords: mechanism design; robust implementation; strong Nash equilibrium; partial subgame perfection; collusion on participation; théorie des mécanismes; implémentation robuste; équilibre fort de Nash; équilibre en sous-jeux partiel; collusion sur la participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
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