Strategic complementarity of information acquisition in a financial market with discrete demand shocks

Christophe Chamley ()
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Christophe Chamley: PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: A simple model of financial market with rational learning and without friction is presented in which the value of private information increases with the mass of informed individuals, contrary to the property presented by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). The key assumption is the possibility of independent discrete shocks on the fundamental value and on an exogenous demand.

Keywords: endogenous information; strategic complementarity; financial markets; aggregation of information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00587697v1
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