Immigration policy and self-selecting migrants

Milo Bianchi

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: I build a simple theory of self-selection into migration and immigration policy formation. I show that any immigration policy affects immigrants skill composition, and this effect may drive the policy outcome in the receiving country. For example, restricting immigration when it is low skilled may worsen immigrants' self-selection and thus the receiving country skill distribution. Hence, understanding the migration decision becomes crucial for analyzing the political economy of immigration. By this composition effect, some natives may support further restrictions even though current immigrants are not harmful for them, and immigration restrictions may be optimal even in a purely utilitarian world.

Keywords: immigrant self-selection; political economy of immigration; immigration policy preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants (2013)
Working Paper: Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants (2013)
Working Paper: Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants (2012)
Working Paper: Immigration policy and self-selecting migrants (2008)
Working Paper: Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants (2006)
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