The design of post-Kyoto climate schemes: selected questions in analytical perspective

Roger Guesnerie ()

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The paper starts from a proposition of institutional design for climate policies made previously by David Bradford and labelled GPGP (Global Public good Purchase). The scheme is compared with other possible post- Kyoto schemes that are, or not, "Kyoto compatible". The comparison puts the emphasis on the participation issue, (free riding, ratchet effect), and on the desirable flexibility of the schemes. It argues that the incidence of climate policies on the final price of fossil fuels is a key and difficult issue which has not received, untill now, the amount of required attention.

Keywords: institutions; carburants fossiles; effet de cliquet; quantité contre prix; incidence fiscale; institutional design; fossil fuels prices; ratchet effect; quantity versus prices; tax incidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00590520v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00590520v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The design of post-Kyoto climate schemes: selected questions in analytical perspective (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00590520

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().