Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports

David Spector

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communication between competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocation mechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.

Keywords: Collusion; Communication; Politique de la concurrence; Jeux répétés (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hap and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01119959v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01119959

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