Repeated Majority Voting

Antonin Macé and Rafael Treibich
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Rafael Treibich: SDU - University of Southern Denmark

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Abstract: We propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior under alternative majority rules. We find that repetition may significantly increase the efficiency of majority voting through a mechanism of intertemporal logrolling, agents sometimes voting against their immediate preference to benefit the group's long-term interest. In turn, this affects the comparison of majority rules, which may differ significantly relative to the static setting. The model provides a rationale for the use of super-majority rules, while accounting for the prevalence of consensus in committee voting.

Keywords: Logrolling; Repeated games; Majority voting; Preference intensities; Consensus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Repeated Majority Voting (2024)
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