Unanimity of two selves in decision making

Pierre Bardier (), Bach Dong-Xuan and Van-Quy Nguyen
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Pierre Bardier: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Bach Dong-Xuan: Universität Bielefeld = Bielefeld University
Van-Quy Nguyen: NEU - National Economics University [Hanoï, Vietnam]

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Abstract: We propose a new model of incomplete preferences under uncertainty, which we call unanimous dual-self preferences. Act f is considered more desirable than act g when, and only when, both the evaluation of an optimistic self, computed as the welfare level attained in a best-case scenario, and that of a pessimistic self, computed as the welfare level attained in a worst-case scenario, rank f above g. Our comparison criterion involves multiple priors, as best and worst cases are determined among sets of probability distributions, and is, generically, less conservative than Bewley preferences and twofold multi-prior preferences, the two ambiguity models that are closest to ours.

Keywords: Decision theory; Incomplete preference; Multiple-selves; Non-obvious manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04615290v1
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