Hoping for the best while preparing for the worst in the face of uncertainty: a new type of incomplete preferences

Pierre Bardier (), Bach Dong-Xuan and Van-Quy Nguyen ()
Additional contact information
Pierre Bardier: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Bach Dong-Xuan: Universität Bielefeld = Bielefeld University
Van-Quy Nguyen: NEU - National Economics University [Hanoï, Vietnam], EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne - Université Paris-Saclay

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We propose and axiomatize a new model of incomplete preferences under uncertainty, which we call hope-and-prepare preferences. Act f is considered more desirable than act g when, and only when, both an optimistic evaluation, computed as the welfare level attained in a best-case scenario, and a pessimistic one, computed as the welfare level attained in a worst-case scenario, rank f above g. Our comparison criterion involves multiple priors, as best and worst cases are determined among sets of probability distributions, and is, generically, less conservative than Bewley preferences and twofold multi-prior preferences, the two ambiguity models that are closest to ours.

Keywords: Decision theory; Incomplete preference; Multiple-selves; Non-obvious manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sea
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04615290v2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04615290v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04615290

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().