Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France

Laura Castell (), Marc Gurgand, Clément Imbert and Todor Tochev ()
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Laura Castell: INSEE - Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)
Todor Tochev: IPP - Institut des politiques publiques

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Abstract: We report on two nationwide experiments with job seekers in France. We first show that a meeting with social services to assess eligibility and help with application to social benefits increased new benefit take-up by 31 %. By contrast, an online simulator that gave personalized information on benefit eligibility did not increase take-up. Marginal treatment effects show that individuals who benefit the most from the meetings are the least likely to attend. Overall, without ruling out information frictions, our results suggest that transaction costs represent the main obstacle to applying for benefits or accessing government's assistance to help apply.

Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Working Paper: Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France (2024)
Working Paper: Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France (2024)
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