Lobbying for Globalisation

Michael Blanga-Gubbay, Paola Conconi and Mathieu Parenti
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Michael Blanga-Gubbay: WTO, UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich
Paola Conconi: University of Oxford, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, CESifo - CESifo, CEP - Center for Economic Performance
Mathieu Parenti: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CESifo - CESifo, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research

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Abstract: Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we construct a unique dataset that allows us to identify which firms lobby on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) negotiated by the United States, their position (in favour or against) and their lobbying effort on the ratification of each trade agreement. Using this dataset, we show that lobbying on FTAs is dominated by large multinational firms, which are in favour of these agreements. On the intensive margin, we exploit exogenous variation across FTAs to show that individual firms put more effort supporting agreements that generate larger potential gains -larger improvements in their access to foreign consumers and suppliers and smaller increases in domestic competitionand that are more likely to be opposed by politicians. To rationalise these findings, we develop a new model of endogenous lobbying on trade agreements. In this model, heterogeneous firms select into trade and choose whether and how much to spend lobbying on the ratification of an FTA, and politicians may be biased in favour of or against the agreement.

Keywords: Trade agreements; Endogenous lobbying; Heterogeneous firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04777509v1
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