Enforcing Colonial Rule: Blood Tax and Head Tax in French West Africa

Denis Cogneau () and Zhexun Mo
Additional contact information
Denis Cogneau: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Zhexun Mo: WIL - World Inequality Lab, Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality - New York

World Inequality Lab Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We examine the enforcement of two pillars of colonial rule in French West Africa, military conscription and head tax collection, using novel district-level data from 1919 to 1949. Colonial states are often characterized as either omnipotent Leviathans or administration on the cheap. Our findings reveal their notable coerciveness in achieving key objectives. Military recruitment targets were consistently met, even amid individual avoidance and poor health conditions, by drawing on a pool of eligible fit young men. Tax compliance was similarly high, with approximately 80% of the liable population meeting obligations. Spikes in head tax rates significantly increased tax-related protests, likely prompting caution among colonial administrators. The tax burden was adjusted according to perceived district affluence, and tax moderation was applied in times of crisis. However, local shocks such as droughts or cash crop price collapses were largely ignored. These results underscore the capacity of colonial states to enforce their authority despite limited policy responsiveness, offering new insights into the political economy of colonial governance.

Keywords: Colonialism; State Capacity; Taxation; Compliance; Conflict; Military Conscription; West Africa; French Colonial Empire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04823289v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04823289v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wilwps:halshs-04823289

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in World Inequality Lab Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().