A study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games

Matias Nunez ()
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Matias Nunez: CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Approval voting features are analysed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: Myerson's Large Poisson Games. I first establish the Magnitude Equiva- lence Theorem (MET) which substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of pivotal events. I also show that the Winner of the election coincides with the Profile Condorcet Winner at equilibrium when preferences are restricted to be single-peaked. This is a positive result that strengthens the positive conclusions some scholars have previously drawn over this voting rule. I finally show that, with- out the previous restriction over preferences, both concepts do not generally coincide anymore.

Keywords: Approval voting; Poisson Games; magnitude computation; Condorcet Winner. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11-30
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