Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: Evidence from a transcontinental Ultimatum Game

Romina Boarini, Jean-François Laslier and Stéphane Robin ()
Additional contact information
Romina Boarini: CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In this paper we present the results of a laboratory test of the "Transcontinental Ultimatum Game" implemented between India and France. The bargaining took the form of standard ultimatum games, but in one treatment Indian subjects made proposals to French subjects and in another treatment French subjects made proposals to Indian subjects. We observed that French->Indian bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favour of French, while pretty equal splits were the most frequent outcome in Indian -> French interactions. The conceptual framework that we introduce to discuss the empirical evidence is a standard social reference norms model modified for taking into account the different marginal value of money of bargainers. Our explanation does not require the consideration of different cultural norms between France and India. It simply relies on relative standings comparisons between players, which occur in respect to the real earnings (that is monetary earnings corrected for a purchasing power factor) obtained in the game. Such norm is called local equity norm, and contrasted to a global equity norm which would encompasses the wealth of players beyond the game. According to what we observed, no beyond-game concern seems to be relevantly endorsed by subjects.

Keywords: Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility; Fairness; Bargaining experiment; Ultimatum Game; Comparaisons inter-personnelles d'utilité; Justice; Equité; Expérience de négociation; Jeu de l'ultimatum (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242919v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00242919v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game (2009)
Working Paper: Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining: Evidence from a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game (2009)
Working Paper: Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game (2009)
Working Paper: Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining: Evidence from a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game (2009)
Working Paper: Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game (2009)
Working Paper: Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining: Evidence from a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242919

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().