Xenophobia and distribution in France: A politico-economic analysis

John Roemer and Karine Van der Straeten ()

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Abstract: We study the effect of anti-immigrant sentiments among voters on the equilibrium position of political parties on the economic issue. We model political competition as taking place among three parties (Left, Right, and Extreme Right) on a two-dimensional policy space (economic issue, immigration issue) using an extension of the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium concept. We "calibrate" the model to French survey data for the election years 1988 and 2002, and show that the immigration issue influences equilibrium on the economic issue in a significant way.

Keywords: Equilibre politique; Xénophobie; Immigration; Taille du secteur public; Xenophobia; Distribution; Political equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242934v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Xenophobia and Distribution in France: A Politico-economic Analysis (2004)
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