Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation

Philippe Mongin

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. This note shows that the strong and little plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.

Keywords: Logical Aggregation; Social Judgment Function; Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; Agrégation logique; Fonction de jugement social; Indépendance des options non-pertinentes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation (2008)
Working Paper: Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation (2006)
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