Food Safety, Liability and Collective Norms

Eric Giraud-Héraud, Abdelhakim Hammoudi and Louis-Georges Soler ()
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Eric Giraud-Héraud: CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Louis-Georges Soler: INRA

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Abstract: Over the last few years, retailers have implemented new collective private norms in order to improve food safety and reduce the risks related to microbial contamination and pesticide residues. In this paper, we propose a model of vertical relationships in which a group of retailers imposes more stringent specifications to upstream producers. We consider that the contamination risk is endogenously determined by the efforts made by the producers in order to improve food safety. We also consider that the penalty costs – related to the liability rule in the event of a crisis – decrease accordingly as the requirement level of the collective norm rises. We show how the liability rule influences the level of the collective norm and the contamination risk

Date: 2006
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243034v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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