A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The traditional model of the theory of social choice admits a host of impossibility theorems and has led to no satisfactory methods for electing candidates or ranking competitors. A new model allows the impossibilities to be avoided with an eminently practical method: "the majority-value."

Keywords: Social choice; Strategy-proofness; Arrow's impossibility theorem; social-grading functions; social-ranking functions; majority-grade; majority-ranking; majority-value; Choix social; théorème d'impossibilité d'Arrow; non-manipulabilité; fonction de notation-sociale; fonctions de rangement-social; note-majoritaire; rangement majoritaire; valeur-majoritaire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243040
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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