One Round versus Two Round Elections: An Experimental Study

André Blais, Jean-François Laslier, Annie Laurent, Nicolas Sauger () and Karine Van der Straeten ()
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André Blais: UdeM - Université de Montréal
Annie Laurent: Université de Lille, Droit et Santé
Nicolas Sauger: CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The paper presents a series of experiments in which participants were invited to vote in four one round elections and four two round elections, with the same set of five candidates, among which three were viable and two were not. The experiments were designed to test the arguments put forward by Duverger and Cox about the propensity to vote sincerely or strategically in one round and two round elections. Our findings indicate little difference between the two systems. In both systems, there was a strong tendency to strategically desert the unviable candidates. The data thus support Cox over Duverger.

Keywords: Vote stratégique; Cox; Duverger; Strategic Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243055v1
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: One Round versus Two Round Elections: An Experimental Study (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243055

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