Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental Evidence

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choice where voters judge candidates instead of ranking them. The theory is explained elsewhere [2, 4]. This article describes and analyzes electoral experiments conducted in parallel with the last two French presidential elections to: (1) show that the majority judgement is a practical method, (2) describe it and its salient properties, (3) establish that it escapes the classical paradoxes, (4) illustrate how in practice the well known electoral mechanisms all fail to meet important criteria. The demonstrations introduce new concepts and methods.

Date: 2007
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243076
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