Vote choice in one round and two round elections

André Blais, Simon Labbé-St-Vincent, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger () and Karine Van der Straeten ()
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André Blais: UdeM - Université de Montréal
Simon Labbé-St-Vincent: UdeM - Université de Montréal
Nicolas Sauger: CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We propose a model of strategic vote choice in which the decision to support or not to support a candidate depends on B, the benefit associated with the election of a given candidate, and V, the candidate's perceived viability. We test the model with data collected in a series of experiments in which the participants voted in eight successive elections, four under one round and four under two rounds. We show that the same model applies to both voting systems, though the impact of perceived viability is slightly weaker in two round elections.

Keywords: voting rules; strategic behavior; Elections; système de vote; comportement stratégique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00335060v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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