Information Congestion

Simon Anderson and André de Palma ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Advertising messages vie for scarce attention. "Junk" mail, "spam" e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message benefit, while senders are motivated by profits. Costlier message transmission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate.

Date: 2008-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00349516
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00349516/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information congestion (2009)
Working Paper: Information Congestion (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00349516

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().