Progressive knowledge revealed preferences and sequential rationalizability

Nicolas Houy

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Abstract: In this paper, we study the link between choices derived from monotonous set-dependent preferences and sequential rationalizability. This link is quite natural since choices derived from monotonous set-dependent preferences (introduced in [Houy, 2008b]) are characterized by a strong axiom of revealed preferences whereas sequentially rationalizable choice functions (introduced in [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007]) are characterized by a weak axiom of revealed preferences.

Keywords: sequential rationalizability; Weak/Strong axioms of revealed preferences; sequential rationalizability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00360546
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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