Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data
Jean Pinquet (),
Charles Vanasse and
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Charles Vanasse: TD Asset Management
Mathieu Maurice: HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal
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Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving. Examples of mechanisms are fines, experience rating and point-record driving licenses. We analyse the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points. These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec public insurance plan. We find evidence of moral hazard, which means that drivers who accumulate demerit points become more careful because they are at threat of losing their license. The insurance rating scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. We use this result to derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions.
Keywords: Mécanismes incitatifs; permis à points; sécurité routière (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data (2011)
Working Paper: Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00414479
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