Raising capital in an insurance oligopoly market

Julien Hardelin and Sabine Lemoyne de Forges
Additional contact information
Sabine Lemoyne de Forges: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, AgroParisTech

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We consider an oligopoly of firms that compete on price. Firms produce a non-stochastic output, insurance coverage, which is sold before the true cost is known. They behave as if they were risk-averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game. At stage 1, each firm chooses its internal capital level. At stage 2, firms compete on price. We characterize the conditions for Nash equilibria and analyze the strategic impact of capital choice on the market. We discuss the model with regard to insurance industry specificity and regulation.

Keywords: Capital Choice; Price Competition; Risk-averse Firms; Insurance Market; Capital Choice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-16
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00417573
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00417573/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00417573

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().