Kinship, Incentives and Evolution

Ingela Alger and Jörgen Weibull

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is non-monotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism, and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this a¤ects economic outcomes.

Keywords: altruism; family ties; free-riding; empathy; Hamilton's rule; evolutionary stability.; evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00435431v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00435431

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