Regulating sovereign wealth funds operating overseas through an external fund manager

André de Palma (adepalmajl@gmail.com), Luc Leruth and Adnan Mazarei
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Luc Leruth: IMF Office in Europe - EUO

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Abstract: This article looks at the relationship between SWFs and their recipient countries, with a focus on the impact it may have depending on the nature of the objectives pursued by the SWF from the perspective of a principal-agent framework. In particular, when the SWF has multiple objectives, there is a risk that signals are misinterpreted and lead to misguided reactions by authorities in the recipient country. Thus, hard to interpret signals do not provide a sufficient case for imposing constraints on the SWF. However, we will show that requiring the SWF to invest through intermediary asset managers may foster cooperation, especially when the objectives of the SWF and of the authorities are closely aligned. SWFs may also alleviate the concerns in recipient countries by acting as an investor (and accepting the funds) of other SWF and non-SWF investors.

Date: 2010-06-02
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