Can they beat the Cournot equilibrium? Learning with memory and convergence to equilibria in a Cournot oligopoly

Thomas Vallee and Murat Yildizoglu

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Abstract: This article analyses the possibility of firms learning collusive solutions in a Cournot quantity game. Starting from the results of Vallée and Yildizoglu (2009) and of Alos-Ferrer (2004), we study the role of random experimenting, social learning (imitation), and (updated) memory in helping firms to discover more collusive market configurations than those of the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We show that long memory and its update is necessary to achieve such configurations.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; Learning; Evolution; Selection; Evolutionary stability; Nash Equilibrium; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10-15
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Related works:
Journal Article: Can They Beat the Cournot Equilibrium? Learning with Memory and Convergence to Equilibria in a Cournot Oligopoly (2013)
Working Paper: Can they beat the Cournot equilibrium? Learning with memory and convergence to equilibria in a Cournot oligopoly (2013)
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