La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun

Philippe Mongin

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Taking the philosophical standpoint, this article compares the mathematical theory of individual decision-making with the folk psychology conception of action, desire and belief. It narrows down its topic by carrying the comparison vis-à-vis Savage's system and its technical concept of subjective probability, which is referred to the basic model of betting as in Ramsey. The argument is organized around three philosophical theses: (i) decision theory is nothing but folk psychology stated in formal language (Lewis), (ii) the former substantially improves on the latter, but is unable to overcome its typical limitations, especially its failure to separate desire and belief empirically (Davidson), (iii) the former substantially improves on the latter, and through these innovations, overcomes some of the limitations. The aim of the article is to establish (iii) not only against the all too simple thesis (i), but also against the subtle thesis (ii).

Keywords: théorie de la décision; Savage; Ramsey; probabilité subjective; utilité dépendante des états; psychologie du sens commun; désir; croyance; Lewis; Davidson (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in 2011

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Working Paper: La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun (2013)
Working Paper: La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun (2011)
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