On Games of Strategic Experimentation

Dinah Rosenberg, Antoine Salomon and Nicolas Vieille ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We focus on two-player, two-armed bandit games. We analyze the joint effect on the informational spillovers between the players of the correlation between the risky arms, and the extent to which one's experimentation results are publicly disclosed. Our main results only depend on whethert informational shocks bring good or bad news. In the latter case, there is a sense in which the marginal value of these informational spillovers is zero.

Keywords: two-arm bandit.; two-arm bandit; social learning; encouragement effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12-15
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00579613v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On games of strategic experimentation (2013)
Working Paper: On Games of Strategic Experimentation (2013)
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