On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of the opponent. Rather, they observe a stochastic signal that may depend on the state, and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume each player observes the state and his own action. We propose a candidate for the max-min value, which does not depend on the information structure of player 2. We prove that player 2 can defend the proposed max-min value, and that in absorbing games player 1 can guarantee it. Analogous results hold for the min-max value. This paper thereby unites several results due to Coulomb.

Keywords: Stochastic games; partial monitoring; value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-24
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Published in 2001

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Related works:
Journal Article: The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (2003)
Working Paper: The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (2003)
Working Paper: On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (2002)
Working Paper: On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (2001)
Working Paper: On the Max Min Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (2001)
Working Paper: On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (2001)
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