Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems

Nicolas Vieille () and Jörgen Weibull

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in a class of such games, namely infinitely repeated decision problems with discounting. The condition is two-fold: the range of possible utility levels in the decision problem should be bounded from below, and the discount factor between successive periods should be non-decreasing over time, a condition met by exponential, quasi-exponential and hyperbolic discounting.

Keywords: Game Theory; Time Preference; Hyperbolic Discounting; Repeated Decision Problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Published in 2002

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Working Paper: Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems (2002)
Working Paper: Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems (2002)
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