De l'impact de la microstructure d'un marché de permis de polluer sur la politique environnementale

Marc Germain, Stefano Lovo and Vincent van Steenberghe
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Marc Germain: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain

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Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between the optimal amount of pollution permits issued by an environmental agency and the mechanisms used to trade these permits in the "secondary market".We show that when permits are traded using a quote-driven mechanism, the total amount of permits to be allocated by the environmental agency depends on two factors: (i) the market structure of intermediaries (i.e. monopolist market maker or competitive market makers); (ii) the presence of uncertainty about the production functions of the polluters.

Keywords: Microstructure of market; Pollution permits; Econometrics; Uncertainty; Production function; Market price; Environmental policy; Microstructure marché; Permis polluer; Econométrie; Incertitude; Fonction production; Prix marché; Politique environnement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Published in 2001

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Journal Article: De l'impact de la microstructure d'un marché de permis de polluer sur la politique environnementale (2004)
Working Paper: De l'impact de la microstructure d'un marché de permis de polluer sur la politique environnementale (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00597024

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