Delegation and coordination in fiscal monetary policy games: Implementation of the best feasible equilibrium

Florin Bilbiie ()
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Florin Bilbiie: HEC Paris - Recherche - Hors Laboratoire - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

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Keywords: Delegation; coordination; fiscal monetary policy games; Implementation; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Published in 2001

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