Interactions on the Quality of Services in Franchise Chains: Externalities and Free-riding incentives

Janghyuk Lee and François Contensou
Additional contact information
Janghyuk Lee: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Our research interest is mainly inspired by the question how different outlets of the same franchise chain react to one another as the demand externalities of the quality of services exist in the chain. We analyze mainly the horizontal relationship between franchisees with focus on their interactions on service quality. Starting from a simple formal model with two independent outlets, we will present the analytic form of the optimal reaction function on which is based the interaction of two outlets. As a result of the interaction, the optimal service quality of two outlets rather increases than decreases.

Keywords: Services; Franchise Chains; Externalities; Free-riding incentives; Interactions; Quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 1999

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00601492

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().