Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting

Hervé Crès and Mich Tvede
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Mich Tvede: Department of Economics [Copenhagen] - Faculty of Social Sciences [Copenhagen] - UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet

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Abstract: A commodity is shared between some individuals; some selection procedure is used to choose allocations. In order to reflect that laws and rules rather than allocations are implemented and that they involve an element of randomness because of incomplete information, selection procedures are taken to be probability measures over the set of allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures are given.

Keywords: Pareto-optimal allocations; infra-majority voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in 1998

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting (2001)
Working Paper: Ordering Pareto-Optima through Majority Voting (2000)
Working Paper: Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting (1998)
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