Equilibrium Uniqueness in Network Games with Strategic Substitutes

Yann Rébillé and Lionel Richefort

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: A local public goods game in weighted and directed networks is analyzed. Individual efforts are imperfect substitutes, players' preferences are heterogeneous and local externalities are non-uniform and asymmetric. Sufficient conditions under which the game admits a unique equilibrium are established in terms of the number of links between agents in the original network. It appears that these latter conditions for uniqueness are met if, and only if, the structure of relationships is \emph{productive}. That is, a parallel can be established between network games with strategic substitutes and the input-output theory pioneered by Wassily Leontief.

Keywords: local public goods; Nash equilibrium; generalized degree; productive matrix; Leontief model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00671555
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00671555/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00671555

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().