Competing with Equivocal Information

Eduardo Perez

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies strategic disclosure by multiple senders competing for prizes awarded by a single receiver. They decide whether to disclose a piece of information that is both verifiable and equivocal (it can inuence the receiver both ways). The standard unrav- eling argument breaks down: if the commonly known probability that her information is favorable is high, a single sender never discloses. Competition restores full disclosure only if some of the senders are sufficiently unlikely to have favorable information. When the senders are uncertain about each other's strength, however, all symmetric equilibria approach full disclosure as competition increases.

Keywords: Strategic Information Transmission; Persuasion Games; Communication; Competition; Multiple Senders.; Multiple Senders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00675126
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competing with Equivocal Information (2012)
Working Paper: Competing with Equivocal Information (2012)
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