Shouting to be Heard in Advertising

Simon Anderson and André de Palma ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Advertising competes for scarce consumer attention, so more profitable advertisers send more messages to break through the others' clutter. Multiple equilibria can arise: more messages in aggregate induce more "shouting to be heard", dissipating profit. Equilibria can involve a small range of loud shouters or large range of quiet whisperers. All advertisers prefer there to be less shouting. There is the largest diversity in message levels for a middling width of advertiser types: both a very wide or very narrow width have only one message per advertiser. The number of advertisers at each message level decreases with the level if the profit distribution is log-convex. Increasing the cost of sending messages can make all advertisers better off. A new technique is given for describing multiple equilibria, by determining how much examination is consistent with a given marginal advertiser.

Keywords: information overload; congestion; advertising; lottery; junk mail; e-mail; tele-marketing; multiple equilibria; ad caps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mkt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00742240
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Shouting to Be Heard in Advertising (2013)
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