Power games and organizational learning

Thierry Levy-Tadjine ()
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Thierry Levy-Tadjine: ICI - Laboratoire Information, Coordination, Incitations - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - European University of Brittany - UBO - Université de Brest - Télécom Bretagne - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IBSHS - Institut Brestois des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société - UBO - Université de Brest

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Abstract: The paper uses the work of CROSS ( 1969) about negotiation to show that Time of conflict and power games in the organizations are not so inefficient for the organization as it first would seem. The article shows especially that the more individuals in conflict use time for negotiation, the more they reduce their pretentions. As a notable result, this formal result is consistent with the Management Socio-Economic approach, Henri SAVALL (1981) developed.

Keywords: Management; Game-Theory; Conflicts; Negotiation; Organizational Learning; Management.; Théorie des jeux; Conflits intra-organisationnels; Négociations; Apprentissages individuels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00848674v1
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