Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment

Radu Vranceanu, Fouad El Ouardighi and Delphine Dubart
Additional contact information
Fouad El Ouardighi: ESSEC Business School
Delphine Dubart: ESSEC Business School

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a mechanism of explicit sanctions allows good performers to focus on their own performance. Not sanctioning an opponent who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger effect.

Keywords: Team work; performance; experimental economics; punishment; économie experimentale; sanction; Travail d'équipe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hrm
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-00857364
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://essec.hal.science/hal-00857364/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00857364

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().